Whose Culture is it?

Trans-generational approaches to Culture

“Si jeunesse savoit;  si vieillesse pouvoit
”- Les Prémices, Epigramme cxci

Henri Estienne (1531-98)

“Youth will come here, beat on my door and force its way in”
 – The Master Builder

Henrik Ibsen (1892)

1.     Background remarks

1.1.  This event has been planned to try to provide a representative picture across Europe of the current state of ‘youth culture’ – and in particular so-called ‘network culture’ – on the basis of sixteen national submissions received from observers and research experts.  The planning group for this Round Table discussion felt (maybe somewhat subjectively) that the apparent divergence which is to be currently seen between more traditionally defined public cultural policy and the way in which young people are today actually participating in, consuming and creating their own culture, may be of a different order to what has been experienced previously.  Is there any hard evidence to support the frequent contention that young people currently are more distant from mainstream cultural policy and provision than was the case in previous generations?  However, the subject is infested with a whole range of national, generational, regional, cultural, technological, economic and social assumptions which turn it into a quagmire where there may be very few secure footholds, and from which it may be dangerous to draw any simple conclusions. 

1.2.  Would the nationally-based papers submitted demonstrate any high degree of correspondence and comparability, or are the individual differences just too great?  Might it nevertheless be possible to draw out some general trends, from which certain reasonably solid conclusions might be drawn which could assist policy makers now and in the future?  If there were apparent high levels of comparability, would this imply that there is some conscious trans-national process going on?  Given that the topic cuts across a wide range of other (i.e. non-cultural) high profile political, social and economic agendas, it was clearly going to be extremely difficult to formulate specific research questions likely to produce the sort of statements or data which would permit direct comparison.  So it has proved. 

1.3.  A number of requests for papers were politely refused as it was considered just too difficult a task to be able to deliver with any likely degree of authority within the limited available time.  Confronting the key research issue of whether virtual ‘network’ culture was in process of supplanting older style face-to-face social contact amongst the young was never going to be easy, approaching it from a somewhat narrow cultural research base.  Working without agreed standard definitions of either ‘youth’ or ‘culture’ was always going to make authoritative comment and comparison difficult.  Nevertheless, from those who did bravely tackle the challenge head-on, the submissions show some remarkable similarities, as well as some rather striking individual differences, in some respects ‘cultural’.  This in itself is interesting and worthy of note and further debate, and certainly should have interest for policy makers in the public sphere.  Canada notes that the young are shrinking as a proportion of total population (19% under the age of 15 – although as a marketing target, the 10 – 30 ‘young’ age group represents 27%.  The UK paper points out that whilst the general birth rate is falling, the ethnic minority population under 20 is increasing.  It is perhaps worth commenting in passing that Turkey (not in the survey) out of a population of approximately 70 million has over 45 million under the age of 30, or around 65%.

1.4.  The sources used are, not surprisingly, mostly of a public policy or academic nature, but they helpfully range rather widely.  What we inevitably lack is access to the more purely commercial market research, which may well provide the key to future trends, but is largely beyond the purview or control of the public authorities.  This relates directly to the survey question about the extent to which people felt there was evidence that the ‘new’ youth culture was market driven (or not), which most respondents not surprisingly found rather difficult to answer, although there is obviously at the same time a very ‘simple’ response which is clearly not wrong.  

1.5.  The latitude in the questions posed has meant that while a number of the responses have attempted to address the issues in quite a narrow ‘cultural’ way, others have legitimately chosen to explore the themes and context in a much more ‘sociological’ manner.  Indeed, it is quite impossible to separate out these two constant strands.  ‘Culture’, as is well known, is one of the most complicated words in English and other European languages, and our chosen subject for this Round Table knowingly walks straight into this minefield and source of public confusion regarding policy whose origins and implications touch on art, anthropology and sociology, to which we now also have to add technology.  In debating the issues, it may help the Round Table to be consciously aware at any given time of which definition is being addressed.

2.     Processing and interpreting the findings of the survey

2.1.  Although it might seem that the obvious and logical methodological approach to trying to summarise and compare key points to emerge in the completed survey questionnaires would be to examine each question in turn, the wide range of answers submitted, and the different lines pursued dictate otherwise.  So far as comparable data is concerned, we also have to contend with the fact that the questionnaire did not seek to impose any particular age group definitions, leaving this to the individual countries/communities to interpret according to their own varied practice.  What clearly does emerge, though, is evidence of marked trends which have considerable similarities (with some significant variations which are explicable on a national or regional basis) and a series of apparent dichotomies.  However, even these apparent differences show a deeper continuity and comparability with past experience and practice than is often assumed, when one looks more closely at the particular social contexts.

2.2.  As signposts along the road to understanding, it is perhaps worth setting down some of these ‘dichotomies’, since they oblige one to think about what is going on in the spaces in between – which may often be where the bulk of the ‘silent majority’ of all ages actually resides.  This unmediated list includes aspects on which respondents have commented encompassing the technical, social, economic and cultural, all of which have relevance to a varying degree to our Round Table theme set out as, maybe artificial, polarities:

·         Real/virtual

·         High/low education levels

·         Ephemeral/permanent

·         Good/poor access

·         Good/poor technical skills

·         Sufficient/low income

·         Employed/unemployed

·         Free time/leisure constraints

·         Instrumental/entertainment

·         Form/content

·         Means/ends

·         Active/passive

·         Legal/black market

·         Global/local

·         High art/popular culture

·         Public/private

·         Solitary/communal

·         Daytime/night time

·         Adult/child

·         At home/away from home

·         Urban/rural

·         Family/social networks

·         Male/female

2.3.  One interesting observation that arises in quite a number of responses is that  considerable doubt needs to be cast on the journalistic cliché of the ‘digital divide’.  When viewed on a proper timescale, this is not so much about youth and age as deriving from education and practice in employment.  Whilst there are, not surprisingly, differences in technical skills and aptitudes between current teenagers, the ‘Erasmus generation’ and the over 30s – simply as a consequence of having grown up with the instant adaptability of the digital age – this gap is narrowing in absolute terms.  The significant gulf is the one which separates those still in employment from the retired generation, which never had to get to grips with the technology, often also linked to relative degrees of financial prosperity in retirement.  The UK response comments on the ‘technical underclass’ of children who have little or no access to ICT, and mentions ongoing research to examine whether this is really about access or use, within the complex economic, social and cultural interrelationship.

2.4.  So far as young people themselves are concerned, the concept of any coherent ‘networked youth culture’ seems to be something of a mythical adult projection, propagated through ignorance or feelings of fear or exclusion.  The range of active youth ‘sub-cultures’, many of them pretty exclusive (and subject to fashion) mentioned in the submissions is very substantial – down to the ultimate statement of rebellious individuality in Finland, not possessing a mobile phone!  Whilst age is, of course, a significant determinant of cultural behaviour, so equally are gender and level of educational attainment.  When the cultural habits of the young, according to quite a number of the submissions, are set alongside their dominant value systems, there is a quite remarkable degree of continuity with those of parents and society at large, albeit often with different emphases.  The crucial difference is in lifestyles.

2.5.  One of the other self-propagating myths concerns the degree to which youth culture in general is ‘global’ or international, an assumption based on a range of commercial, brand-marketing and technological factors.  Once again, the evidence gathered seems to suggest this is perhaps more of an external projection from the adult world than a true reflection of reality.  Certainly many of the favoured products have global or multi-national origins, and sometimes allegiances, but closer examination of how they are used provides a contrary message.  Whilst much of the technology does indeed have an international capacity, its predominant usage can be extremely local.  This is partly a consequence of financial constraints and social patterns among young people, but it is possible to conclude that the available technology is simply being harnessed as an additional tool and grafted onto existing social and leisure habits, rather than changing them radically.  The evidence of the survey adds further weight to the increasing universality of the ‘glocalisation’ phenomenon.

3.     The Market – irresistible arbiter, or two-way deal?

3.1.  The size and importance of youth culture obviously means that the economy, and above all commercial interests, will pay enormous attention to exploiting it.  Alongside the computer and mobile `phone as purely commercial products we should set the very high levels of interest which all respondents confirm in music, dance and fashion among young people.  However, responses also suggest that this is far from being a captive market.  The young – particularly where their level of education is higher – are more than capable of deconstructing the commercial culture as manifested through advertising and marketing.  So, whilst they might appear to be following fashions blindly, there is often a much more subtle and critical culture of irony that goes with it.  Within ‘youth culture’ there is also a significant strand which quite deliberately favours authenticity and reality in order to counteract the effects of blatant commercialism. There is also mention of a shift in mood since ‘9/11’ which regards technology qua technology with greater suspicion.

3.2.  There is plenty of evidence to show that the market can and does often determine trends (for one clear example, see the Serbia & Montenegro response describing how its music market is going).  Nevertheless, this should not be taken as a blanket global phenomenon.  The submission from Greece, by contrast, refers to some rather different popular music developments, which have a much more local/national character despite the size of the country’s economy rendering it highly vulnerable to external penetration by commercial culture.  Thus, while the external appearance of brand-name jeans and T-shirt wearing, Coca Cola drinking, Nokia-toting European youth may superficially look similar, beneath that facade there are often very considerable differences.  The Belgian Flanders response draws particular attention to this prevalent but eclectic ‘pick ‘n’ mix’ behaviour exhibited by the young, and the constant shift in sub-cultures according to fashion.

3.3.  Economic realities according to the evidence play a huge part in dictating patterns of engaging with this ‘commercial’ culture and network phenomenon, particularly in respect of mobile phone and Internet usage.  Here there are significant ‘national’ and regional variations, clearly reflecting overall levels of prosperity, employment, and even traditional habits in normal social communication.  Serbia with 47% of its registered unemployed in the under 30 age group (60% never having had any work experience) reckons that at least 20% work in the black economy.  Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary all report relatively low Internet access rates (as compared with assumed European norms) but Kazakhstan owing to a short-lived period of economic prosperity has secured itself a high level of penetration.  Russia records that the annual rate of increase is now pretty rapid. The Slovak Republic’s response suggests that rates of use would be much higher if leisure patterns allowed for it – suggesting that in struggling economies time can be almost as important a ‘currency’ as money.  Time constraints amongst the young in the UK are also drawn to our attention.

3.4.  Ways round the harsh personal economic constraints also seem to be increasingly in place.  Internet cafés are frequently alluded to, as is free access in public libraries and other such institutions (from the UK to Bulgaria’s drive at both national and regional government levels to revive the traditional chitalishta as networked centres).  In Bulgaria there is also the four or five year old phenomenon of local ‘computer games rooms’ which are very widespread and well-patronised by the young, irrespective of the local economic conditions.  About half of these venues offer Internet services as well – but the general quality is poor, and the cost relatively high in relation to the cost of living.

3.5.  Almost all the evidence gathered suggests that mobile phone usage among the young is, despite its almost unrestricted geographical potential, above all a local and highly social phenomenon.  The rapid growth in texting, SMS and MMS, and its associated developing ‘youth’ codes and languages is partly a by-product of its being cheaper than ‘phone connection.  E-mail – other than amongst the employed and the higher educated – appears to have nothing like the same degree of popularity, but increases rapidly in the middle age groups.  In Greece there may even be particularly strong social conventions and expectations that are militating against its growth in general as a medium of communication.

3.6.  It appears therefore that whilst the market is often setting the pace and trends, it is also heavily investing (particularly in relation to music and fashion trends in clothes) in trying to follow and exploit new trends which young people are themselves creating, often on quite a local basis, and even sometimes maybe with a touch of post-modern irony recycling retro-trends (see Belgian response).  At the same time, the young are canny in their use of the available technology in order to ensure that their money goes as far as possible.  It would seem that the give and take between the youth market and the commercial operators is quite a dynamic process in which neither side has a monopoly of control.

4.     Demographic and Social trends

4.1.  Comment has already been made in passing on the strong influences of gender, education and age.  To this should probably also be added family patterns and the strength (or otherwise) of civil society as significant background factors.  All responses seem to agree that young people besides having an instant adaptability through growing up in the digital age are becoming independent at a younger age than used to be the norm.  However, there do appear to be important differences here.  The ‘northern’ European model (e.g. Finland, Netherlands, Belgium) clearly places this within a strong civil society context, where the young tend to leave the family home earlier than used to be the case.  The ‘Mediterranean’ model, most strongly expressed from Greece, but also relevant to Spain, Italy, Hungary and some Balkan countries, emphasises the continuing strength – and sometimes accompanying constraints – of family patterns and lifestyles.  Comment from ex-Communist Europe (notably Bulgaria and Russia) draws attention to the individualism of young people as a conscious distancing from the compulsory socialist organising habits of the old Komsomol youth organisations.

4.2.  A further paradox is that whilst young people are in many ways growing up faster and becoming independent at ever-younger ages, many of them are also undergoing an extended family dependence as a direct consequence of higher education and the difficulty of breaking into the employment market.  From Hungary we have a fascinating comparison between attitude surveys conducted in 1973 and 2000, which concludes that their ‘generation gap’ is probably today considerably less than it was under Socialism, despite the new ‘technology’ gap. An analysis of the role of the computer/Internet in the lives of their young people shows that it is far from dominant, and that there is a surprising continuity of values and choices between the generations.  The response from Slovakia offers food for deeper thought in its citing of research into how young people spend their free time, broken down into four different basic personality types. 

4.3.  There is an implication – overtly stated in some responses (e.g. Finland, Spain) – that despite perceived differences, the values of young people tend to reflect the values of society at large.  Certainly some of the emphases are different, and the technically-based cultural codes and constantly changing lifestyles can give the impression of more distance than is perhaps fundamentally the reality.  Evidence from Russia shows that the audience for ‘live’ cultural events is now predominantly less than 25 years of age (the main problem, as in many other countries, is not availability or access, but simply money with which to support the desired lifestyle).  The Belgian response provides evidence of a surprisingly high degree of correlation in music and media preferences between the young and their parents.  There is a general sense that families are more flexible and less authoritarian than formerly across the generations.

4.4.  A number of the responses make specific reference to the scale of the problem over drug (and alcohol) abuse by the young (Serbia & Montenegro, Bulgaria, Russia, Slovakia and Spain) suggesting that this is one of the few high profile ways in which young people appear on the policy radar of central government.  This often leads to a negative overall view of the young, which is far from representative.  Several of the papers draw attention to a youth reaction against the overtly materialistic values of the 1980s and 1990s, but also note (e.g. Finland) the paradox of growing prosperity being accompanied by less security.  Contrary to the frequent adult political characterisation of young people in general, there is an enormous diversity within their culture and sub-cultures.  Fads and fashions change rapidly, and it would be a mistake to look for coherence or consistency.  With the strong individualism in both values and interests goes a heightened interest in selected single issues, including environmental and Third World causes. 

4.5.  Education level is a key determinant, which is particularly drawn attention to as a distinguishing feature both within the younger generation(s), and between the generations.  For those with higher education, the ‘Erasmus generation’ has benefited from mobility which was not previously so available, but even here within Europe the differing economic conditions since 1989/90 make for great differences in opportunity.  Network culture can seem a lot less ‘trans-national’ if the real experience is still unavailable.  Some responses (e.g. Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia & Montenegro) mention travel as something which has a positive effect in strengthening civil society.  Youth leisure and Internet use patterns can also vary considerably according to domestic/family circumstances. 

4.6.  There are varying daytime/night time patterns of activity and involvement depending on whether the young people - specially students in higher education - are in the family home or not (whether permanently or temporarily).  The Greek paper draws specific attention to the problems for those who have been educated or worked abroad, who find they have to lower expectations upon their return because of the constraints of social and employment systems.  In general, low educational achievement is noted as a very significant factor, which is directly related to low expectation, satisfaction, income and participation.  It is observed that in Italy this corresponds to regional prosperity.

4.7.  Despite the general level of comment on the ‘selfish’ individualism which is taken as rising in the later 1980s and the 1990s, there is a more positive angle on the way information technology has brought new dimensions to family and social life.  The decline (according to the majority of the evidence) in watching TV is partly attributed to its ‘dumbing down’ but against this we need to set other ways of spending leisure time in the home.  There is also a variety of data which draws attention to the quantitative and qualitative difference in use of the Internet for work/study or self-improvement purposes, for communication (specially e-mail) and for games and pure entertainment.

5.     Network Culture – a decisive feature?

5.1.  The main features commented on under this heading are PCs, the Internet and mobile `phones.  The profiles and tables (difficult to compare directly since the age bands vary from country to country) show a reasonably consistent picture.  Those with higher aspiration, access, and resources tend to be the highest users of the Internet as ‘knowledge’ in the age groups one would expect.  Younger ages with access tend to major on games.  Older people, the unskilled, unemployed, and minority groups at the margins of society are least engaged and register as the lowest Internet users.  Where there is some measurement of usage (e.g. Finland) it seems that older people tend to use PCs as pure ICT aids rather than for communication purposes. 

5.2.  In general, there is some evidence that there is widespread use of new media as straightforward tools for expression and communication – which suggests continuity of practice rather than any radical divergence.  The Italian paper specifically comments on the increasing use of these media in artistic experimentation and production, and Canada’s refers to usage in low cost film production.  Practice (whether in creation, production or marketing and distribution) therefore shows some balance between doing completely ‘new’ things, and providing cheaper or more efficient variants on doing ‘old’ things in a different way.

5.3.  New democracies mostly record that there are problems over universal access to the Internet, doubtless partly as an effect of their economic condition.  The Polish paper comments that lack of substantial Polish content on the Internet may be an additional factor contributing to low levels of access and usage.  The Canadian submission draws attention to one of the central paradoxes of youth ‘network’ culture.  It is often both a catalyst for communal sharing, more often than not in real time and real space, and yet can also be a solitary activity practised in isolation within virtual space.  Attempts to compare such analysis of Internet usage time as we have is difficult (for study, games, communication or whatever) since there are so many special factors of local significance which affect it.

5.4.  In discussing the possibly decisive influence of ‘network’ culture, the Kazakhstan response makes the interesting observation that since distance learning is almost inevitably rooted in previous experience, and furthermore that ICT teachers are mostly drawn from the ‘middle’ generation, information culture and ideology cannot really be regarded as a ‘youth’ phenomenon, and is therefore still linked to the mainstream.  E-mail as a medium of communication seems according to most (but not all) of the evidence to be much more prevalent amongst the generations beyond ‘youth’ – in part a by-product of family and employment circumstances.  The youth age groups tend to demonstrate a preference for using their access to the technology for chat rooms, games, and downloading music and other items.  Downloading tends to increase substantially in the approximate 19 to 25 age band.

5.5.  Amongst young people themselves, the gender divide shows up most strongly in relation to the use made of PCs and mobile `phones.  Among younger teenagers, chat is exceedingly popular – with the data for girls invariably being higher than that for boys.  Where figures are offered, usage of chat rooms drops off after the ages of 15 or 16.  The Spanish response notes that males appear to be more connected to networks through their use of technology, whereas females have a preference for using it to set up real time contact.  It goes on to observe that whilst the Internet theoretically provides access to international networks, language barriers and functional physical networks mean that youth culture is much less ‘global’ than is often assumed. Some British research has data which differentiates between boys’ preference for sport and games against girls’ for music and TV.  Young ‘urban villagers’ are busy recreating village community ties in big city contexts.  The mobile `phone and SMS above all is the instrument of this strong trend.  The responses from Russia, Serbia & Montenegro and Bulgaria also comment specifically on a clear gender divide.  The Greek and Finnish papers also note a gender distinction in attitudes to spending money on leisure and social activity, with females appearing to be more prudent.

6.     Linguistic and Location constraints

6.1.  Reference has been made above to language knowledge as a barrier in relation to the Internet, which further underlines the parallel point about educational attainment being a key determinant so far as knowledge and self-improvement are concerned.  Italy notes that this is becoming a decreasing problem as general levels of competence in both English and Spanish are rapidly improving.  Romania’s submission comments that English, as the main language of the Internet is no longer a barrier for young artists – although it may of course be for other sizeable portions of the population.  Bulgaria records that only about 8% of the population has any understanding of English – although games etc. on the Internet do not pose any such problem.  So far as trans-national creative effort using language is concerned, of course, meanings in English may only be rather approximate, and can be difficult even for native speakers to comprehend.  Italy comments on both the creative artistic hybrids which are in constant development, and the development of new slang and communication modes which are coming about through texting.

6.2.  A further irony of the theoretical universal availability of the technology is that geography/place of residence is still one of the key determinants of full participation.  Levels of activity and participation seem according to the commentaries and data to be highest in the large cities, with small towns and rural areas lagging far behind.  Although the ‘urban villagers’ phenomenon may give part of an explanation, this is surely more about resources and trends.  The 2003 survey in Hungary disappointingly shows that place of residence seemed to be an even more marked factor than it had appeared to be from the previous survey. 

6.3  Most countries at least mention the urban/rural split, which is clearly a      common feature.  The paper on Greece notes further social context behind this in observing that there is now a sizeable percentage of the totally urban young whose grandparents were, and still are, totally rural or village-bound.  This represents a complete reversal within three consecutive generations.  Furthermore, where climate used to dictate a sociable open air culture for children for much of the year, this is rapidly changing into more solitary and ‘indoor’ habits as surfing the net and downloading have become strong elements in youth culture.

7.     State Cultural Policy and wider policy implications

7.1.  So far as ‘official’ cultural policy is concerned, the responses paint a fairly negative picture.  Culture Ministries if they pay any attention to the issue at all, tend to regard young people as potential (or missed) audience for what they are well used to supporting.  The Dutch paper observes that mainstream cultural provision is firmly locked into ‘monotasking’, mostly packaged in very traditional ways.  It also draws attention to one example of trying to break down those barriers - the growing movement for ‘museum nights’ targeted specifically at the young. There is little sense of urgency or recognition however that the culture itself may progressively be changing from within.  Italy records some limited success in a Ministry concessionary price initiative to promote ‘mainstream’ culture to the young, and the UK has restored the right of free museum admission, and the Culture Ministry has taken a few initiatives to try and involve the young in designing future services.  But for all the belated recognition by governments of the importance of the ‘creative industries’ it seems rare for a Culture Ministry to be making the running.  The youth market is more likely to be regarded as exactly that – a market, there to be exploited by trade and industry.  Neither ethics nor aesthetics appear to be high on anyone’s agenda. 

7.2.  The response from Romania notes a real challenge to traditional real public libraries.  The evidence, often backed up with data, from most contributions to this Reader shows that this must be a growing problem everywhere, even if it has not yet been officially identified.  It is observed from Romania that whilst libraries in rural areas are still regarded as extremely important, the Internet – whether in the home or in outlets such as Internet cafés – is rapidly superseding them in the major urban areas.  Given the interdependence of urban and rural library services, this looks like a wake up call. The figures from Hungary suggest that after the revival in cinema-going through the advent of multiplexes, the numbers seem to have peaked, and are falling off. 

7.3.   There is some comment on Culture Ministries which have – or had – internal divisions addressed to young people, and on how governments in general attempt to address policy for young people.  The observations imply that this is usually regarded as weak, ineffective or in a governmental vacuum (Bulgaria, Kazakhstan etc.) or else is completely side-stepped by being relegated to local (and/or regional) administrations as their problem (Italy, Greece).  Following the temporary flurry of interest in young people by the Greek government around the Olympic Games, there is a complete absence of any follow up by the Culture Ministry, and there is a continuing lack of integration of youth policy into mainstream government policies.  Signs of any coherent links being built between the cultural issues and, say, education, unemployment and poverty, are rare.  Canada, with its strong government computerised initiative to provide maximum information access to the entire population of its massive territory, has a junior section of its ‘Canadian Culture Online’ in development.

7.4.  It is difficult to resist concluding that where young people’s culture is concerned, the standard approach of European governments is to problematise it, which tends to reinforce a negative view and fortify the arguments on both sides of the alleged ‘generation gap’.  This is neatly symbolised in Cyprus through youth policy being located in the Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for the courts and police.  Drug and alcohol abuse, sexually transmitted diseases, on-line violence and fomenting hate, childhood obesity, pornography and cyber-stalking – these are the issues which are engaging government attention.  Whilst no doubt leading to necessary specific policies and action, this focus seems to be primarily on treating the young as an anti-social or victim category, which does little to help empower the young vis à vis the adult world.  Spain has recognised the importance of youth matters through the creation of an institute (INJUVE) attached to the Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs.  The British response comments that despite the bad press that youth tends to get (over 70% negative according to a MORI poll), this fails to reflect the reality of their rather active involvement in the voluntary sector (evidence of 73% within the 16 to 24 age group within the previous 12 months).

8.     Concluding observations

8.1.  Any long-lasting effects coming out of current youth and ‘network’ culture are hard to pin down or predict, although certain trends now established seem abundantly clear.  Many of the responding authors find it impossible to be precise, since the internal processes they are observing are so organically connected to supra-national trends and developments.  There are massive ‘grey areas’ around means/ends, individual/communal etc. which show patterns which can legitimately be interpreted in different ways.  On the whole, it seems that nobody is that keen to specify any particular ‘European’ dimension, which is not to deny the trans-national contact that happens as a logical consequence of intentions which may come from a completely different starting point. 

8.2.  There are some differences between ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ countries, but these are in most cases simply a consequence of the economic conditions in countries still ‘in transition’ as they affect individuals and groups, and where culture as an instrument of ideological control is dead and buried.  There are no fundamental ideological divides between the young people themselves, whose individualistic and eclectic behaviour seems, in some instances, to be moderated through the continuing force of strongly traditional social and family systems.  The urban/rural divide, and the differences this creates in attitude, access and levels of usage of new technology is universally remarked upon, as is that other key determinant, level of education and aspiration for self-improvement when one moves beyond the level of games/entertainment.  Age bands (approximately comparable) and gender are also noted as clear indicators of certain marked habits, trends and practices.

8.3.  Only a few countries addressed the copyright issue head on (Finland, Canada, Italy) but it is worth drawing attention to their observations which have considerable importance for the way young artists are increasingly creating their work, and how it is consumed by the youth audience/market.  Finally, there is broad agreement that all countries could do much more to integrate the key themes of our discussion into their mainstream policies (at all levels), in which a greatly improved coordination of research and policy initiatives would help.

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